![]() ![]() ![]() Using survey experiments and case studies of U.S. Fears of nuclear escalation by their guarantor can drive clients to distance themselves from their alliance or seek stronger independent nuclear capabilities. These guarantees can cause clients to fear that their guarantors will drag them into a precipitous nuclear conflict. In contrast to this approach, I argue that credible nuclear guarantees can backfire. Credible security guarantees, on the other hand, are thought to reassure allies. If allies do not believe their guarantor will actually come to their aid, they may seek alternate means of protection, including by investing in nuclear infrastructure. Existing literature posits that the main challenge for nuclear security guarantees lies in making the promise of protection sufficiently credible. My current book project explores how credible nuclear security guarantees can backfire.
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